

P 031313Z APR 95
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6903
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 001886

DEPARTMENT FOR PM/DAS COOK FROM AMBASSADOR
ALSO FOR AF, AF/RA AND AF/S - JACKSON
LONDON FOR YOUNG

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: [PREL](#) [SADC](#) [BC](#)
SUBJECT: SADC CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFERENCE: AMBASSADOR'S
MEETING WITH BDF COMMANDER KHAMA

REF: STATE 73668

[1](#)1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

[1](#)2. AS REQUESTED REFTTEL, AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND ODC CHIEF, MET WITH BDF COMMANDER IAN KHAMA MARCH 29 FOR A READOUT ON THE GABORONE CONFERENCE OF SADC MEMBER STATE ARMY CHIEFS OF STAFF. KHAMA SAID ONLY ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND LESOTHO WERE UNREPRESENTED AT THE MEETING, WHICH FOCUSSED ON CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT. SOUTH AFRICA, AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT, WAS REPRESENTED BY SANDF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MEIRING. ACCORDING TO KHAMA, THE FOLLOWING FOUR SUBJECTS WERE ADDRESSED:

-- THE TYPE OF STRUCTURE BEST SUITED TO TRY TO PREVENT CONFLICTS AND TO MANAGE THEM IF THEY DO BREAK OUT;

-- THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF COUPS;

-- DISCUSSION OF THE HARARE PEACEKEEPING SUMMIT TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIONAL OR CONTINENT-WIDE APPROACHES TO PEACEKEEPING;

--THE EFFECT OF REFUGEES ON STABILITY AND HOW TO REDUCE THEIR NEGATIVE IMPACT.

STRUCTURE/ AREAS OF INTER-STATE COOPERATION

[1](#)3. PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFIED AREAS IN WHICH THEY SHOULD ENGAGE IN REGULAR COOPERATION. KHAMA CITED THE FOLLOWING AS DIRECTLY RELATED TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT: OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE FOR EARLY WARNING, LOGISTICS, AVIATION, MARITIME ASSETS. MEDICINE (E.G. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON REGIONAL OUTBREAKS OF DISEASE, AIDS) AND OTHER UNSPECIFIED AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR COOPERATION EVEN OUTSIDE THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONTEXT. THESE PROPOSED AREAS OF COOPERATION WERE ALLOCATED TO MEMBER STATES REPRESENTED. EACH WILL ORGANIZE A MEETING TO FURTHER EXPLORE EACH RESPECTIVE TOPIC AND PREPARE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL APPROVAL AT A JUNE DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA.

PREVENTION OF COUPS

[1](#)4. KHAMA SAID MANY, INCLUDING HIMSELF, "POINTED FINGERS AT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP" ON THIS ISSUE. THEY FELT THAT POOR MANAGEMENT BY THE POLITICAL LEVEL, RESULTING IN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, CONTRIBUTED TO CREATING FERTILE GROUND FOR COUPS. KHAMA CITED UNBALANCED DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION, AND FAVORITISM ALONG TRIBAL LINES, INCLUDING IN THE ARMED FORCES, AS CONTRIBUTORS TO THE PROBLEM. POOR TREATMENT OF THE MILITARY POSES ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS, KHAMA SAID, CITING THE FACT THAT JUNIOR RANKS, NOT JUST COMMANDERS ARE NOW ENGAGING IN COUPS. THE ARMY COMMANDERS CONCLUDED THAT THE AVOIDANCE OF COUPS COULD ONLY BE ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL LEADERS, NOT MILITARY MEN.

REFUGEES AND STABILITY

15. THIS FOURTH POINT CENTERED ON THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON STABILITY AND MEANS TO REDUCE THEIR NEGATIVE IMPACT. AS WITH THE AGENDA ITEM ON COUPS, KHAMA SAID THE MEETING CONCLUDED THE IMPACT AND MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEES WAS A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED BY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NOT THE ARMED FORCES. THE DISRUPTION CAUSED BY REFUGEE FLOWS, AND THE PERCEPTION IN SOME COUNTRIES THAT BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS, REFUGEES ACHIEVE A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING THAN LOCAL CITIZENS, CAUSED REAL PROBLEMS. HE CITED TANZANIA AS A COUNTRY PARTICULARLY HARD HIT BY THIS PROBLEM.

HARARE PEACEKEEPING SUMMIT

16. KHAMA TOLD AMBASSADOR THE GABORONE MEETING ACHIEVED THE LEAST ON THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC. THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION, HE SAID, OF REGIONAL LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT NO ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS : "WHO WILL EQUIP AND FUND PEACEKEEPERS?" AND "WHO WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO STORES OF EQUIPMENT FOR PEACEKEEPING, AND WHEN?"

17. AT THE MEETING, KHAMA REMINDED HIS COUNTERPARTS THAT IN THE LESOTHO CRISIS ONLY SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTSWANA HAD BEEN ABLE TO MOBILIZE AND TRANSPORT THEIR FORCES. ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, BY CONTRAST, REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION FOR THEIR TROOPS AND MATERIEL. THE BDF COMMANDER STRESSED TO THE AMBASSADOR HIS CONVICTION -- WHICH HE ALSO CONVEYED TO THE GABORONE MEETING -- THAT "ALL NATIONS MUST HAVE A COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT ANY TROOPS THEY SEND. THEY MUST NOT ASK JUST ONE COUNTRY (I.E. SOUTH AFRICA) FOR HELP." ANY PEACEKEEPING ENGAGED IN BY REGIONAL FORCES, HE UNDERLINED, WOULD HAVE TO BE ENDORSED IF NOT REQUESTED BY THE UN AND/OR OAU. THIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO REQUESTS FOR DONOR SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.

18. IN SOUTH AFRICA IN JUNE DEFENSE MINISTERS WILL MEET TO TRY TO COME UP WITH A FORMULA FOR FIRST USING MEMBER STATES' OWN RESOURCES FOR PEACEKEEPING, THEN TURNING TO THE UN FOR SUPPORT. KHAMA STRESSED HIS VIEW THAT INITIATING REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON RECEIVING DONOR SUPPORT FROM THE OUTSET. INSTEAD, HE SAID, THERE MUST BE NATIONAL POLITICAL COMMITMENT IN EACH COUNTRY. EACH COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO COMMIT NATIONAL RESOURCES TO PEACEKEEPING IN ADVANCE OF REQUESTING INTERNATIONAL DONOR HELP. THIS, KHAMA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR, IS WHAT HE INTENDS TO "WHISPER IN (HIS) MINISTER'S EAR" AT THE MEETING IN SOUTH AFRICA.

THUMBS DOWN ON STANDING FORCE BUT SUPPORT FOR EARMARKING

19. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR KHAMA'S VIEWS ON THE STANDING FORCE CONCEPT. KHAMA SAID HE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF A "COMBINED STANDING FORCE," PRIMARILY FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, BECAUSE TO BE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD HAVE TO TRAIN TOGETHER -- SOMETHING MOST COUNTRIES IN THE REGION CANNOT AFFORD. SECOND BECAUSE, IN KHAMA'S VIEW, PARTICIPATION IN A COMBINED STANDING FORCE WOULD AMOUNT TO BOTSWANA SIGNING AWAY ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DECIDE, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WHEN AND WHERE TO SEND ITS TROOPS. BY CONTRAST, KHAMA FAVORED CREATION OF A FORCE BASED ON EARMARKING SPECIFIC CONTINGENTS IN EACH PARTICIPATING MILITARY AND PREPARING THEM TO BE MOBILIZABLE WITHIN 48 HOURS. ODC CHIEF NOTED THAT EVEN UNDER NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND EACH NATION RETAINS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO RELEASE ITS EARMARKED FORCES TO NATO COMMAND.

LOTS OF QUESTIONS; NO DECISIONS

10. KHAMA REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MEETING DID NOT/NOT AGREE ON ANY STANDBY FORCE OPTION. MANY QUESTIONS REMAINED, INCLUDING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIZE OF SUCH A FORCE, COORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE UN, AND WHETHER A REQUEST TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT SITUATION WOULD BE INITIATED BY THE UN OR BY THE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION. THERE WAS AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THAT A COUNTRY ASKED BY THE UN TO DEPLOY FORCES SHOULD IN TURN SEEK UN

SUPPORT. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM THE ODC CHIEF KHAMA SAID DEPLOYABILITY HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON A FORCE PERTAINING ONLY TO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN (SADC) REGION, NOT BEYOND (E.G. TO BURUNDI).

¶11. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAS NO FIXED FORMULA IN MIND BUT IS EAGER TO RECEIVE AND EXAMINE OTHERS' VIEWS ON REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING, PARTICULARLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE MAY MEETING AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE. KHAMA REITERATED HIS LONG-STANDING CONCERN THAT ANY PEACEKEEPING ARRANGMENT FULLY RESPECT AND PRESERVE A COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DECIDE, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, WHETHER, WHERE, AND WHEN TO DEPLOY ITS TROOPS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PROPOSALS SUCH AS A CANADIAN ONE (UNFAMILIAR TO US) TO CREATE A STANDING RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE.

THE FLS/ASAS/SADC CONNECTION

¶12. AMBASSADOR CLOSED BY ASKING HOW THE INTERSTATE COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY FITS WITH SADC. IN RESPONSE, KHAMA RECALLED THAT LAST YEAR IN ARUSHA COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAD DECIDED THEY DID NOT WANT TO BECOME PART OF SADC. WHILE THE TRANSITION FROM OLD TO NEW ORGANIZATIONS IS CURRENTLY A BIT CONFUSED, KHAMA SAID THAT IN THE END, THE FRONTLINE STATES (FLS) WILL BE TRANSFORMED INTO THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES (ASAS) AND "WE (I.E. THE COMMITTEE) SEE OURSELVES LINKED WITH ASAS." IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, KHAMA WENT ON TO SAY HE EXPECTED NO COORDINATION PROBLEMS BETWEEN ASAS AND SADC SINCE THE SAME COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF BOTH GROUPS AND POLITICAL DECISIONS ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING ARE MADE BY THE SAME LEADERS.

COMMENT

¶13. THREE THINGS STRUCK US ABOUT THE KHAMA BRIEFING: ONE IS THE DETERMINATION AND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH KHAMA AND HIS ARMY COMMANDER COLLEAGUES ARE APPROACHING THESE ISSUES; TWO IS THE ACTIVE AND SUPPORTIVE ROLE THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS NOW PLAYING IN THESE DISCUSSIONS; AND THREE IS THE DIFFICULTY OF COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT RESOLUTION/MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

¶14. WHILE WE ARE UNSURE OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MAY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE MEETING, IT SEEMS, FROM WHERE WE SIT, THAT WE COULD MAKE A LARGE CONTRIBUTION BY HELPING COUNTRIES IN THIS REGION TO WORK OUT THE CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS ON WHICH FUTURE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT/PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS MAY REST.

JETER